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PEACEFUL PICKETING FOR UNLAWFUL
OBJECTIVE
LAURENT B. FRANTZ*
With increasing frequency, injunctions against peaceful picketing
are being granted in the state courts on the ground that, though the
manner of picketing is unobjectionable, the goal sought by the pickets
is not a lawful labor objective.1 Though adherence to this unlawful
purpose doctrine is remarkably uniform, 2 there is still considerable doubt
both as to how to identify the objective in picketing, and by what
standards to determine its legality. There is also some doubt as to how
far the doctrine may be carried, since the right to picket is, at least for
some purposes and under some circumstances, constitutionally protected
as a form of free speech.3
The unlawful purpose doctrine seems to have two historical roots.
The first is in the derivation of our modern labor law from the common
law doctrine of criminal conspiracy,4 which regarded any combination
of persons as criminal which sought either a lawful objective by unlaw-
ful means or an unlawful objective by means ordinarily permissible.5
The second, associated with the name of Justice Holmes, 6 is in the doc-
* A.B., LL.B., University of Tennessee; member of the Tennessee Bar; mem-
ber of the Alabama Bar; graduate student, Duke University Law School.
I See comments in 16 U. oF Ca L. REv. 701 (1949); 28 OmE. L. Rav. 391
(1949) ; 5 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 259 (1948) ; and cases collected in Anno., 174
A. L. R. 593 (1948).
2 There have been a few dissenting voices. The Supreme Court of Nevada
stated in State ex rel. Culinary Workers Union v. Eighth Judicial District Court,
207 P. 2d 990, 993-4 (1949) : "The right to peaceful picketing must not be circum-
scribed by vague and ephemeral notions of 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' purposes
for which it may or may not be exercised. Free speech, which includes the right
to peaceful picketing, must be given the greatest possible scope and have the least
possible restrictions imposed upon it, for it is basic to representative democracy."
But on rehearing, though it declared that its earlier opinion was reaffirmed, the
Court also remarked that picketing to accomplish unionization "was for a lawful
objective." 25 L. R. IL M. 2023 (1949).
The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the unlawful purpose doctrine in
favor of the clear and present danger test in State ex rel. Lumber & Sawmill
Workers v. Superior Court, 164 P. 2d 662 (1945).
"If picketing is a form of free speech, it may not be enjoined although carried
on for an improper objective." TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLEcrIVE BAR-
GAINING (1940), 1947 SU-VPLEMNT 80. See also Armstrong, Where Are We
Going with Picketing, 36 CALIF. L. Rlv. 1, 34-39 (1948).
'FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABaO INJuNcTIoN 1-24 (1930).
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 203 (1892).
Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HA v. L. REv. 1 (1894). See Holmes'
opinions in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) ; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass.
492 (1900) ; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194 (1904).
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trine of presumptive tort 7 which treats any intentional injury as action-
able unless the actor can prove justification.
In the last decade the courts have increasingly resorted to the un-
lawful purpose doctrine as a convenient escape from the constitutional
identification of picketing with free speech.8 A simultaneous and paral-
lel development has been the tendency to give a restricted definition to
the term "labor dispute" for the purpose of narrowing the scope of state
anti-injunction statutes.9 In some recent cases, the question of what
is a "labor dispute" and of what is a lawful labor objective have tended
to become almost indistinguishable.'"
IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTIVE
From the complex of aims and motivations behind an instance of
picketing, the selection of a single goal to be treated as the picketing
objective is not so simple as it might sound." In holding the objective
of picketing lawful or unlawful, courts have focused the question at
six different levels:
1) The effort to inform the public of the controversy;12
"1 TELLER, LABOR DisPUTES AND CoLLECTvE BARGAINING 183-193 (1940).
'For example: "If picketing is speech, it is certainly also much more. How-
ever peacefully it may be carried on, it possesses elements of compulsion upon the
person picketed which bear little relation to the communication to anyone of in-
formation or of ideas.... Until we are more positively directed to the contrary
we prefer to think . . . [that it can be enjoined] . . . at least in a case like this
where the defendants' method of speaking involves an otherwise unlawful com-
bination for an unjustified objective and a form of compulsion which is not speech
and which strikes directly at the basic right of a man to use his hands to earn a
living." Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N. E. 2d 12, 14-15 (1947). See
authorities cited notes 1 and 3 .rupra.
' See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Green, 119 Colo. 92, 200 P. 2d 924
(1948) (demand for closed shop after workers voted against union not a labor
dispute). Contra: Baker Community Hotel Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees,
207 P. 2d 1129 (Ore. 1949). Several state courts, however, have recently held
restriction of the right of picketing to "labor disputes" unconstitutional. Ex Parte
Hunn, 357 Mo. 256, 207 S. W. 2d 468 (1948) ; Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers
v. Cox, 219 S. W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1949) ; Ira A. Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn.
402, 215 S. W. 2d 801 (Tenn. 1948). In the Hunn and Cox cases, statutes em-
bodying the rule were held invalid.
10 See, e.g., Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 874 (Sup.
Ct., App. Div. 1st Dep't. 1948) (picketing against out-of-state goods); Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Green supra note 9. In Construction & General Labor
Union v. Stephenson, 221 S. W. 2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), picketing to de-
mand unionization was enjoined on grounds of no labor dispute. On appeal, the
Texas Supreme Court held the statute restricting picketing to labor disputes un-
constitutional, but upheld the injunction on unlawful purpose reasoning. 25 L.
R. R. M. 2228 (1950).
"For a psychologist's estimate of its complexity, see Stagner, Psychological
Aspects of Industrial Conflict: II. Motivation, in forthcoming Spring, 1950 issue
of PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY.
12 Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters v. Missouri Pacific Freight Transport, 220 S. W.
2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (purpose of picketing railroad depot was to inform
public of principal-agent relationship between railway and the local transfer com-
pany with which union had dispute) ; see Foutts v. Journeymen Barbers, 88 N. E.
2d 317 (Ohio C. P. 1949) (though union might not lawfully take master-barber's
shop card for refusing to become non-active member, it might lawfully picket to
acquaint public with facts of dispute).
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2) The nature of the aid sought from the persons whose support
the picketing solicits ;13
3) The nature of the intended pressure on the party picketed ;14
4) The nature of the concession which the party picketed is desired
to make;15
5) The union's more immediate reason for desiring that conces-
sion ;16
6) The union's over-all institutional objective.' 7
It is clear that ihese are not alternatives but rather are all present
together in a typical case. For example, the simplest possible case of
"recognition picketing" has all the following aims, any one of which
can be called its "objective": (1) to inform customers of the existence
of the dispute; (2) to persuade customers to withhold their trade; (3)
to cause the employer loss of income; (4) to induce the employer to
sign a contract; (5) to strengthen the position of the union, thus mak-
ing it a more effective instrument for attaining (6) more satisfactory
arrangements for workers in the industry. It is clear that each step is
simultaneously means and end, the objective of the previous step and
the means toward the one following. It is also clear that the le-
gality of a picketing objective can be considerably varied on the same
state of facts by a somewhat arbitrary selection of an "objective."' 8
This wealth of possible approaches may lead to the recognition of
two or more objectives, one of which is ruled lawful and the other un-
lawful. In this situation, it has been held that the pickting may be
" Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slowuta, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 91 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1948) (secondary boycott); Sterling v. Duke, 33 Ohio App. 482, 67
N. E. 2d 24 (1946) (picket line by one union caused members of another to cease
work, violating contract).
"' Hanke v. Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters, 207 P. 2d 206 (Wash. 1949); Cline v.
Automobile Drivers Union, 207 P. 2d 216 (Wash. 1949) (picketing self-employed) ;
Pipe Machinery Co. v. DeMore, 76 N. E. 2d 725 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (picketing
homes of non-strikers).
" Hobbs v. Poteet, 357 Mo. 152, 207 S. W. 2d 501 (1947) (induce dairy to
boycott non-union drivers). This is the commonest approach. See cases cited
illfra notes 20 through 23.
.. Baker Community Hotel Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 207 P. 2d
1129 (Ore. 1949) ; Berger v. Sailors' Union of Pacific, 29 Wash. 2d 810, 189 P.
2d 473 (1948).
"' Standard Grocery Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich. 276, 32 N. W. 2d 519 (1948)
(inducing employer to coerce workers into union justified by purpose of raising
wages to union standard) ; Hennigh v. Teamsters Union, 18 L. R. R. M. 2213
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1946) (inducing retail stores to boycott dairy justified by purpose
to organize dairy workers) ; Lubbers v. Hurst, 78 N. E. 2d 580 (Ohio C. P. 1946)
(closed shop means toward laudatory objective of organizing entire industry).
The ultimate objective test was rejected in Burlington Transportation Co. v.
Hathaway, 234 Ia. 135, 12 N. W. 2d 167, 13 L. R. R. M. 706 (1943) (inducing
truck drivers to stop deliveries to grocery not justified by objective of organizing
grocery) and apparently also in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S.
490 (1949) (inducing violation anti-trust law not justified by desire to improve
wages and working conditions).
'-1 Compare, e.g., Standard Grocery Co. v. Local 406, supra note 17, with Mas-
sachusetts cases cited infra note 32.
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enjoined, if there is no evidence that the union has renounced its unlaw-
ful aim.19
TEsTs OF LEGALITY OF OBJECTIVE
Recent cases applying the unlawful purpose doctrine seem to fall
roughly into three broad classifications, which, for convenience of ref-
erence, may be called "illegal result cases," "balance sheet cases" and
"ultra vires cases." "Illegal result cases" designates those in which
picketing, if successful, will produce some arrangement or act which
the law or public policy has attempted to prevent. "Balance sheet cases"
describes those in which the court enjoins picketing because the objec-
tive which it seeks to achieve is not considered sufficiently necessary or
important to justify the harm to the plaintiff's business which the picket-
ing would bring about. "Ultra vires cases" refers to those in which
the object sought, though not a violation of positive law, is neverthe-
less held to be outside "the allowable orbit of labor activity."
The strongest case for an unlawful purpose injunction is where the
objective sought would violate a criminal statute, for example, a state
anti-trust law20 or a state "right to work" statute,2 ' prohibiting union
security agreements. A variation of this situation which furnishes the
great bulk of the cases is that where the concession sought from the
employer is one which, if granted, would constitute an unfair labor
practice under state22 or federal23 labor relations acts.
Inducing a railroad or an express company to fail to perform its
duty as a common carrier has been held to render picketing illegal, both
where such non-performance was clearly a purpose sought by the
pickets24 and in situations where it may have been a mere accidental
result.25 Inducing breach of contract is also a frequent ground for
" Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S. W. 2d 733, 174 A. L. R.
585 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 837 (1948). But see Iacomini's Restaurant v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 85 N. E. 2d 534 (Ohio C. P. 1948).
20 Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N. W. 2d 905 (1945); Giboney v.
Empire Ice and Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
21 Construction and General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 221 S. W. 2d 375
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949). But cf. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood,
249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 847 (1948).
"Consumers Sand & Gravel Co. v. Kalamazoo Trades Council, 321 Mich. 361,
32 N. W. 2d 531 (1948); Wisconsin Emp. Re. Brd. v. Journeymen Barbers, 39
N. W. 2d 725 (Wis. 1949). "
22 Douds v. Local 1250, Retail, Wholesale Union, 170 F. 2d 700 (2d Cir. 1948);
Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177 P. 2d 873 (1947).
Contra Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Teamsters' Union, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.
2d 891, 162 A. L. R. 1426 (1946) ; Gerry of Calif. v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 119,
194 P. 2d 689 (1948).
"Burlington Transportation Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Ia. 135, 12 N. W. 2d 167
(1943); Northwestern Pacific R. R. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 31
Cal. 2d 441, 189 P. 2d 277 (1948).
" Turner v. Zanes, 206 S. W. 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Simons v. Retail
Clerks Union, 21 L. R. R. M. 2685 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948). But cf. Int'l. Bro. of
Teamsters v. Missouri Pacific Freight Transport, 220 S. W. 2d 219 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
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anti-picketing injunctions, 20 and this also has been extended from pur-
pose to result.
27
A few cases have held that picketing may be enjoined where its
purpose is one which, though not a violation of positive law, is never-
theless contrary to public policy.28 An interesting application of this
view is the California rule that a closed union may not picket for a closed
shop.29 This rule was recently held to render illegal the picketing of
stores with the demand that they hire Negro help in proportion to their
Negro clientele.30
Some few cases take the "balance sheet" view that, though a labor
objective is not per se objectionable, it may still be of insufficient im-
portance or the union's interest in it may be too indirect to justify
picketing.31 Thus, Massachusetts, long before the Taft-Hartley Act,
held that though closed shop agreements were legal and enforceable,
picketing for a closed shop was unlawful.,3 2 Even where the labor
interest is treated as a form of free speech, it has been held outweighed
by the right to conduct a lawful business with a minimum of inter-
ference.
3 3
" Markham & Callow, Inc. v. Int'l. Woodworkers, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P. 2d 727
(1943) ; Pacific Navigation & Trading Co. v. Nat'l. Org. of Masters, 207 P. 2d 221
(Wash. 1949); Int'l. Asso. of Machinists v. Downtown Employees Asso., 204
S. W. 2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Fay Loevin Apparel Shops, Inc. v. Harlem
Labor Union, 24 L. R. R. M. 2567 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part V 1949).
Contra Lichtenberger-Ferguson Co. v. Int'l. Jewelry Workers, 20 L. R. R. M.
2785 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1946) ; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.
2d 631 (dictum).
2 Sterling v. Duke, 33 Ohio App. 482, 67 N. E. 2d 24 (1946).
M8R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N. E. 2d 685 (1942) ; Gazzam
v. Bldg. Service Employees' Union, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (1947) (closed
shop); Los Angeles v. Bldg. Trades Council, 210 P. 2d 305 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1949) (demand that city water works employees be reclassified).
" James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329, 160 A. L. R. 900
(1944) (Negroes excluded from full membership) ; Riviello v. Journeymen Bar-
bers, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P. 2d 400 (1948) (worker-proprietors excluded
from full membership) ; Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P. 2d 343 (1944)
(union picketed for jurisdiction over work done by peddlers ineligible to mem-
bership).
'0 Hughes v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P. 2d 885 (1948). In the Hughes
case, the Negroes' demand was regarded as equivalent to a closed union seeking
closed shop treatment as to a certain proportion of available jobs. For other
approaches to this problem, see Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Ad. 109,
99 A. L. IL 528 (1935) (held objective of Negro employment lawful, but picketing
not lawful means toward such objective) and New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938) (held picketing for Negro employment is
"labor dispute" within Norris-LaGuardia Act, hence not enjoinable in federal
court).
" Dinoffria v. Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters, 72 N. E. 2d 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1947). See also cases cited infra notes 32 and 33.
Davis Bros. Fisheries v. Pimentel, 78 N. E. 2d 93 (Mass. 1948); Colonial
Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N. E. 2d 1 (1947) ; Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313
Mass. 385, 48 N. E. 2d 1 (1943).
22Dinoffria v. Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters, supra note 31, Lafayette Dramatic
Productions, Inc. v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 N. WV. 2d 57 (1943); Shively v.
Garage Employees Union, 6 Wash. 2d 560, 108 P. 2d 354 (1940).
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"Ultra vires cases" were relatively frequent a decade ago.8 4 Though
this version of the unlawful purpose doctrine is probably not dead,8 6 it
seems to be growing less common in the more recent decisions.
A few state courts have drawn from the identification of picketing
with free speech the logical conclusion that the injunction should be
aimed only at the unlawful purpose and that the right to picket for
other purposes should be left open.8 6 In the great majority of instances,
however, the decrees are formulated as absolute prohibitions of any
further picketing.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
As recently as 1921, it was regarded as an unconstitutional discrimi-
nation against employers to limit the use of the injunction in labor
disputes more narrowly than in other types of disputes.. 7 Even the
liberal minority of the court, though supporting the right to picket,
regarded it as having no constitutional sanction.38 The change in the
national attitude toward labor which produced the Norris-LaGuardia
and Wagner Acts gave birth also to a new constitutional doctrine. In
the Senn case,39 in 1937, in -upholding a state anti-injunction statute,
Justice Brandeis made the fateful remark that "Members of a union
might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution."
40
During the same period a few state courts began to hold that picket-
ing was a constitutional right.41 In the Thornhil142 case, in 1940, the
United States Supreme Court held that a statute embodying sweeping
1i TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 346-51 (1940) and
cases there cited.
. ." Dinoffria v. Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters, 72 N. E. 2d 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1947) (dictate working hours to self-employed gas station operator); Saveall v.
Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N. E. 2d 12 (1947) (dictate prices to self-employed
barber)." Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Teamsters Union, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P. 2d
891 (1946) ; Gerry of Calif. v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P. 2d 689 (1948) ;
lacomini's Restaurant v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 85 N. E. 2d 534 (Ohio
C. P. 1948).
" Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
"s See Brandeis (joined by Holmes and Clarke) dissenting in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488 (1921).
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
"0 Id. at p. 478. Gregory contends this remark has been misinterpreted and was
not intended to imply that picketing is free speech. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW
340 (1946).
41Reno v. Second Judicial District Court, 59 Nev. 416, 95 P. 2d 994, 125
A. L. R. 948 (1939) ; Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 81 P. 2d 190 (1938).
For a vague dictum which might be interpreted as suggesting a constitutional
right to picket, see Citizens Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, 187 N. C. 42,
49-50, 121 S. E. 31, 35 (1924).
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). See also companion case, Carl-
son v. California, 310 U. S. 106, rehearing dMied, 310 U. S. 657 (1940) (statute
forbidding display of placards and banners in aid of picketing invalid).
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prohibitions against picketing is void on its face both as unconstitution-
ally vague and as a violation of the freedom of speech guarantees of the
First Amendment as embodied in the Fourteenth.4 3 Though the Thorn-
hill holding was limited to a statute which did not regulate picketing,
but banned it entirely, 4 some of the language of the opinion seemed to
imply a much broader doctrine. Thus, it is said that "in the circum-
stances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." And the Court
added:
"Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be justified
only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under cir-
cumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas
by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.
We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is
neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping pro-
scription of freedom of discussion embodied in section 3448. ' '45
In the Swing case46 in the following term, the Thornhill doctrine
was extended to the invalidation of a state labor injunction, the Court
remarking that:
"The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by
the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an in-
junction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined
by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. ... Communica-
tion by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them
to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of
concern for the economic interests against which they are seek-
ing to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in
Thornhill's case."
'47
Simultaneously, the Court approved a blanket injunction against
picketing in the Meadowmoor case, 48 holding that a context of violence
may give even peaceful picketing a coercive effect. The doctrine, how-
ever sound, was of such dubious applicability to the case at bar 49 as to
suggest that the Court was eager for an opportunity to limit the scope
of the Thornhill case.
"Since Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) (dictum); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (free press) ; and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
(1937).
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 104 (1940).
" Id. at pp. 104-105.
"Amer. Fed. of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, rehearing denied, 312 U. S.
715 (1941).
"Id. at pp. 325-326.
"Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
"The violence in Meadowmoor, though considerable, was over long before the
injunction suit commenced and there was no finding that the union had authorized
or encouraged it. See Justice Reed's dissent, id. at p. 317.
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In the Wohl case, 50 in the following term, the Court reversed an
injunction which had apparently been granted on unlawful purpose
reasoning, though with a remark 5 ' which some courts and commenta-
tors have interpreted as implying that the unlawful purpose doctrine
would have been upheld had it been clearly presented.52 Simultane-
ously, the Court affirmed the injunction in the Ritter's Cafe case,58
holding that a state may confine the right to picket in a labor dispute
to "the area of the industry" in which the dispute arises.64
After holding in the Angelos case 55 that picketing may not be pro-
hibited merely on the ground that it does not satisfy the state's definition
of the term "labor dispute," the Court retired for six years from active
leadership in the picketing question.
The long silence was broken in 1949 with the Giboney case,50 which
requires a more detailed examination. A Union of ice deliverers had
organized four of the local ice plants. The fifth, Empire, employed the
peddler system, i.e. they sold ice at the plant to drivers who owned their
own trucks and who resold it to customers on their routes. The union
picketed Empire, demanding that ice be delivered only by union drivers.
Considering Empire's drivers as independent business men rather than
employees, the Missouri court concluded that the agreement asked was
one not to sell to non-members of the union and violated that state's
anti-trust law, a felony statute carrying a sentence of five years im-
prisonment. The picketing, admittedly peaceful, was enjoined.5 7
In upholding the injunction, the United States Supreme Court re-
marked that:
"... the placards were to effectuate the purposes of an un-
lawful combination, and their sole, unlawful immediate objective
was to induce Empire to violate the Missouri law by acquiescing
in unlawful demands to agree not to sell ice to non-union ped-
dlers." 58
"oBakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942)."i "The respondents say that the basis of the decision below was revealed in a
subsequent opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was said with regard to the
present case that 'we held that it was an unlawful labor objective to attempt to
coerce a peddler employing no employees in his business and making approximately
thirty dollars a week, to hire an employee at nine dollars a day for one day a week'
.... But this lacks the deliberateness and formality of a certification and was ut-
tered in a case where the question of the existence of a right to free speech under
the Fourteenth Amendment was neither raised nor considered." Id. at p. 774.
"2Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P. 2d 343 (1944); TELLER, op. cit.
supra note 4, 1947 SUPPLEMENT 78.
" Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, rehearing denied,
316 U. S. 708 (1942).
"' The dissenters pointed out that no such qualification applies to other forms
of free speech. Id. at p. 732.
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
" Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
"Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 210 S. W. 2d 55 (1948).
" Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502 (1949).
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Despite this language, the Court's opinion does not discuss the unlawful
purpose doctrine developed in numerous state cases. Instead, it places
as the central question whether a state may constitutionally apply its
anti-trust statute to labor unions. Having decided that it may, it finds
no difficulty in concluding that conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute is not constitutionally protected "merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written or printed."59
This sheds confusion rather than light on the constitutional status
of the unlawful purpose doctrine. On the one hand, it is more con-
sistent with the unlawful purpose doctrine than with Thornhill. On
the other, it cites Thornhill with approval60 and makes no mention of
any of the numerous authorities, both cases and commentators, which
might have been cited in support of the unlawful purpose doctrine.
The reasoning of Giboney could not be applied directly to any purpose
less unlawful than the violation of a criminal statute. One is tempted
to conclude that the Court desires, for the time being, both to facilitate
the use of the unlawful purpose doctrine by state courts and to avoid
an express commitment in its favor. 61 It seems clear, however, that
the unlawful purpose doctrine and the identification of picketing with
free speech spring from opposite premises and it is difficult to see how
a choice between them can be avoided indefinitely.
New light on the Supreme Court's attitude may be expected soon.
As this article goes to press, four cases in which unlawful purpose in-
junctions are challenged by the unions involved as violative of their




The simultaneous nourishing of two inconsistent theoretical premises
has left the law of picketing peculiarly exposed to confusion, uncertainty
and judicial subjectivity.
That part of the confusion which has arisen from the arbitrary
"' Ibid.
" Id. at pp. 497-499.
" The same day the Giboey decision was handed down the Court denied
certiorari, 336 U. S. 945 (1949), in Wilbank v. Chester, etc. Bartenders Union,
360 Pa. 48, 60 A. 2d 21 (1948) (picketing for closed shop by minority union was
for unlawful purpose.
" These four cases are: Hughes v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P. 2d 885
(1948) (picketing for proportional hiring of Negroes); Hanke v. Int'l. Bro. of
Teamsters, 207 P. 2d 206 (Wash. 1949) (picketing self-employed); Cline v.
Automobile Drivers Union, 207 P. 2d 216 (Wash. 1949) (picketing self-employed) ;
Cline v. Automobile Drivers Union, 207 P. 2d 216 (Wash. 1949) (picketing self-
employed); Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 207 P. 2d 199 (Wash. 1949)
(picketing for closed shop). The oral argument in the Gazzam case is reported
in 18 U. S. L. WEEK 3229 (U. S. Feb. 14, 1950).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
selection of a picketing objective might be partially avoided if the courts
would adopt the Restatement definition that:
".... an object of concerted action by workers against an em-
ployer is an act required in good faith by them of the employer
as the condition of their voluntarily ceasing their concerted action
against him." 63
But the tests by which the legality of the objective is determined also
need critical analysis.
The older "ultra vires cases" proceeded on the theory that the am-
bitions of the labor movement can be rendered static. The fact that
what was yesterday an unquestioned management prerogative is often
today a customary topic of collective bargaining suggests the contrary.0 4
The "balance sheet" test frequently overlooks the fact that the in-
terests, either of labor or management, can be stated either in a narrow
economic form or generalized into a public principle.0 5 Some thumb-
on-the-scale balancing may result from generalizing the interests of one
side more broadly than those of the other.0 6 Yet, even without this
factor, the "balance sheet" test leads to a form of compulsory arbitra-
tion of the merits of the primary dispute, rather than of the right of
one party to resort to the tactic of picketing.
Where a result which is plainly illegal is threatened, the courts can-
not be blamed for seeking to find preventive measures. Yet even in
these cases, one might question whether chancery is a well-adapted
tribunal or injunction a socially desirable remedy for dealing with labor
disputes. 67 Few things have caused more labor bitterness or distrust
of the judiciary than the record of the labor injunction in the period
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS §777 (1939).
" Clifton, Managencut Functions in N. Y. U. CONFERENCE oJ LABOR 89 C1
seq. (1948)... For example, in Shively v. Garage Employees Union, 6 Wash. 2d 560, 108 P.
2d 354 (1940), where a gas station was picketed to sign a union contract, the court
stated: "In the instant case, we are concerned with balancing appellant's right to
carry on a lawful business, free from unreasonable interference, and respondent's
right to freedom of speech."
" For example, in Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N. E. 2d 12, 15 (1947),
where an independent barber was picketed to charge the union price scale, the court
stated: "If we are correct in supposing that the right to picket is subject, for the
protection of paramount public welfare, to some balancing of the conflicting in-
terests of the parties immediately involved, we have before us a case where, on
the one hand, the contribution of the defendants' acts to the free interchange of
thought in Fitchburg reaches the vanishing point, while on the other hand there
is danger that the fundamental right of the plaintiff to work with his own bands
to what he regards as his best advantage may be destroyed."
"7 "Injunctions in labor disputes have not generally proved to be an effective
means of settling them; frequently they have aggravated rather than allayed a
conflict. They have the deceptive appeal of the quick and easy and therein lies
their danger, for disputes between workers and employers, now often complicated
by internecine disputes among workers themselves, are not always of comparable
simplicity." Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Teamsters Union, 27 Cal. 2d 599,
608, 165 P. 2d 891, 897 (1946).
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from the Debs case 8 to the adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.69
Nor should it be overlooked that, to the extent that picketing has a
free speech aspect, the unlawful purpose injunction is a form of prior
censorship. 70 Whatever else picketing may do, it conveys a message
of protest for which there is usually no other practicable channel. It
is a serious matter summarily to deprive a dissatisfied group of its only
effective means of giving peaceful expression to its dissatisfaction.
"lit re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 131-133 (1930).
o Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
